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Alyosha Goldstein
Where the Nation Takes Place:
Proprietary Regimes, Antistatism, and
U.S. Settler Colonialism

On September 13, 2007, the United Nations

General Assembly adopted the Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by a vote of
143 in favor to 4 against with 11 abstentions.
Thirty years of coalition building and lobbying
by the International Indian Treaty Council and
indigenous groups worldwide and more than
two decades of negotiation within the UN preceded the vote.1 The groundwork for the declaration arguably goes as far back as September
1923, when Cayuga chief Deskaheh traveled to
Geneva on behalf of the Haudenosaunee (the
Iroquois Confederacy) to petition the League of
Nations about violations of international law by
the United States and Canada. Conspicuous as
the four dissenting votes in 2007 were Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. Strident opposition by these countries suggests the
substantial threat that indigenous rights claims
continue to pose to the fictive coherence of settler
nation-states, which have historically sought to
render the persistence of “nations within” as a
domestic concern without international implication. Indeed, settler colonialism in the United
States has insinuated itself over time in such a
way as to obscure the persistence of colonialism
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as anything other than a historical trace, as well as to ostensibly naturalize
settlers by habitation and descent.
In the United States, the vote against formalizing the rights of indigenous peoples has of course direct relevance for U.S.–American Indian relations and should be considered in the context of the recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York. In March
2005, the Court ruled against the Oneida, concluding that two centuries of
non-Indian land tenure in effect annulled the tribe’s outstanding territorial
claims. Although the decision directly affected only taxation, its legal implications further undermined tribal self-determination in the United States
and quickly served as precedent in a number of prominent court cases. That
jurisprudence has so thoroughly defined and determined the legacies of the
colonial encounter not only constrains the terms of redress but, inasmuch
as law promises to be a correlate of justice, also promises future resolution.
This perpetually deferred resolution compels liberal juridical subjectivity
and contract as requisite points of departure. The role of legal reason in the
making of the modern rights-bearing possessive individual and in animating the conflict of private interests on which legal regulation is premised
has been essential for the notions of self and property in liberal societies
generally and in settler societies in particular. Moreover, Jacques Derrida
argues, “Law is always an authorized force, a force that justifies itself or is
justified in applying itself, even if this justification may be judged from
elsewhere to be unjust or unjustifiable. Applicability, ‘enforceability,’ is not
an exterior or secondary possibility that may or may not be added as a supplement to law.”2 The U.S. vote against the UN declaration and the Sherrill
ruling are especially interesting for the ways in which they apply equality in
law and authorize the force of law in order to safeguard inequality outside
of law.
This essay focuses on what this U.S. posture conveys about the colonial
present in North America, as well as the ways in which white settler colonialism in the United States is articulated with the present-day constellation of neoliberal antistatism and post–civil rights “color-blind” discourse.
I examine the statement issued by Robert Hagen, U.S. advisor to the UN,
against the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and analyze his
remarks in relation to both the Sherrill decision and the reactionary populist discourse of antisovereignty groups more broadly. Non-Indian “citizen”
groups lobbying and litigating against American Indian sovereignty are an
important part of this conjuncture, not only because their rhetoric shares
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Hagen’s emphasis on equality and rights claims detached from historical inequities, but also because of the ways in which these groups in fact
envision themselves in opposition to the state and their actions as a more
pure and authentic embodiment of American principles. In this essay, I am
primarily concerned with the relationships among three elements of U.S.
colonialism: the role of settler claims historically and in the present; how
colonial projects advanced in part by legal disputes over the distribution of
political authority; and the assertion of historical dispossession as a means
to preempt American Indian self-determination and restitution.
Settler colonialism in North America is not a relic of the past but a historical condition remade at particular moments of conflict in the service of
securing certain privileges and often to symbolically negotiate inequalities
among white people. The postconquest history of North America and the
making of the U.S. nation-state have been overdetermined by competing
colonial regimes, settler claims, circuits of slavery, and the negotiation of
seemingly incommensurable borders and cosmologies.3 Understanding
this context as more than a bygone historical era whose significance was
eliminated with the overthrow of British rule demands addressing the
peculiarities of settler colonialism and the ways in which “settlement” compromises and complicates colonialism as a relationship to a geographically
distant ruling authority. As historian Ian Tyrell argues, “Settler societies
represented a particularly complex and resilient form of European colonial expansion often not recognized as imperial conquest by its own agents
precisely because they claimed to do more than extract wealth and then
return to the metropolitan space.” Similarly, anthropologist Patrick Wolfe
notes, “Settler colonies were not primarily established to extract surplus
value from indigenous labor. Rather, they are premised on displacing indigenes (or replacing them) on the land.”4 Accordingly, settler colonialism is
not so much an “event” or a static relationship as a condition of possibility
that remains formative while also changing over time.
The term settler colonialism is nevertheless fraught with its own discursive complicities. Cultural critic Michael Warner argues that the placid rhetoric of settlement casts the history of the British American colonies as a
narrative free of violent conquest. As Warner observes, “Settling is intransitive, or, if it has an object, the object is merely the land.”5 Throughout the
“colonial period,” British settlement in North America galvanized a sense
of belonging and place within the empire for colonists. At the same time,
settlement provided European colonizers with a sense of themselves as
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locals. “Settlement” as such already implied an entitled and possessive relation to place, as compared with the supposedly unsettled nature of indigenous populations. This worked in concert with colonial ideologies that subordinated indigenous peoples as “primitive” and by divine right rendered
the continent the property of those Europeans who would suitably cultivate the land. The collision, contest, and adaptation of Spanish, French,
Dutch, and British colonial regimes—and the constellation of resistance
and maneuver they prompted—not only changed over time but were further complicated by subsequent immigration, as well as the Atlantic slave
trade and its aftermath. Even as “settler” held little appeal or longevity as
a political identity, the legal stipulations for who qualifies as “indigenous”
remain embattled.
Yet the density and sometimes imperceptible dynamics of this imperial
overlay should not lead us to believe that simply making visible genocide and
dispossession is adequate to address the conditions of the colonial present.
Indeed, in contemporary antisovereignty discourse, genocide and dispossession are acknowledged and accentuated as historical realities that are
said, in fact, to contradict the assertion of Indian self-determination. Rather
than indict Euro-American perpetrators, the fact of near-annihilation and
the extensive displacement of Indian peoples is used by antisovereignty
activists as evidence of the necessarily diminished capacity of tribal nations
to make present-day claims. Whether confronted by the dismissive stance
of antisovereignty groups—a position with apparent influence at the highest levels of the U.S. diplomatic corps, as evidenced by the rhetoric of the
U.S. vote against the UN declaration—or faced with the intransigence of
the U.S. state and the politically fickle rulings of the Supreme Court, tribal
nations in the United States since Deskaheh have often turned to international forums for adjudication and redress. Not that international law—
with its beginnings in Francisco de Vitoria’s conception of natural law on
behalf of the Spanish colonial enterprise—offers any guarantee of justice,
but rather that such forums might substantiate the national status and
authority of indigenous petitioners and therefore initiate possibilities for
international accountability.6
Rights of Refusal
Just as neoconservative appropriations of civil rights discourse are not only
indicative of cynical opportunism but also speak to the very material limits
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of the civil rights framework, the statement circulated to the UN General
Assembly by Hagen serves as yet another cautionary tale about the utility
of abstractly universal “human rights.” It was, after all, partially in deference to the inviolability of human rights that the United States justified its
dissent. Furthermore, Hagen’s statement speaks to how these universal
values—both “human” and “rights”—are themselves bound up with modern property and sovereignty as they have been at least partially constituted
by the juridical fictions of colonial conquest. The statement notably stops
short of acknowledging how indigeneity is itself a category legible only by
way of the colonial encounter and the recent nation-state world order.
In response to the UN declaration, Hagen objected that this was to “be an
aspirational declaration with political and moral, rather than legal, force.”7
Hagen reaffirmed U.S. criticism of the 1993 draft declaration and charged
that the declaration introduced a new legal concept of “self-government
within the nation-state.” He jettisoned the political history of U.S.-Indian
relations in order to maintain that “indigenous peoples generally are not
entitled to independence nor any right of self-government within the
nation-state.” At stake here was the fateful letter s on which so many of the
battles over the declaration during the past two decades have turned. This
is the difference between “indigenous people” or “indigenous populations”
and “indigenous peoples,” the latter implying national sovereignty and the
right to self-determination according the UN Charter.8 A subsequent UN
resolution by European and U.S. representatives devised the “salt water
doctrine”—limiting their support only to decolonization overseas—so as
to repudiate pressure for self-determination from “nations within.”9
U.S. opposition to the 2007 declaration followed an equivalent rationale.
Hagen contended that at no point in the drafting of the declaration were
its articles “intended to imply that the existing right of self-determination
is automatically applicable to indigenous peoples per se or to indicate
that indigenous peoples automatically qualify as ‘peoples.’”10 According to Hagen, to do so would fatally undermine U.S. democracy. This is
because “collective rights”—an enduring dilemma within the discourse of
liberal legalism—supposedly threaten majority rule with the tyranny of a
minority. The declaration was unacceptable to the United States because,
as a nation ostensibly committed to the principle of human rights, Hagen
proclaims, “human rights are not to be violated in the exercise of collective
rights.” In other words, to specify “indigenous rights” would contaminate
the universal rights of humankind with a corrosive particularity; it would,
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in effect, cancel out universal rights by making rights claims on behalf of a
specific group of people. In this regard, Hagen hyperbolically insists, “We
strongly support the full participation of indigenous peoples in democratic
decision-making processes, but cannot accept the notion of a sub-national
group having a ‘veto’ power over the legislative process.”
Hagen’s refusal to recognize the nation-to-nation relations constitutive
of U.S.–American Indian relations insists on a fictive territorial and political exclusivity for the United States. It is precisely the contested character
of territorial integrity that his comments aim to deny. Indeed, despite the
historical distinctions between the two, Hagen’s statement foregrounds the
question of land as tied to sovereignty. Thus, he protests: “The provisions
on lands and resources are phrased in a manner that is particularly unworkable. . . . For example, Article 26 [of the declaration] appears to require recognition of indigenous rights to lands without regard to other legal rights
existing in land, either indigenous or non-indigenous. Clearly the intent
of the Working Group was not to ignore contemporary realities in most
countries by announcing a standard of achievement that would be impossible to implement.”11 It is difficult to conceive how Hagen might envision
an “aspirational” document that simultaneously reinforces “contemporary
realities.” But the emphasis here is both on acknowledging and absolving
past expropriation through the logic of private property. Thus, dispossession has occurred, and however regrettable, it was not realistic—“would be
impossible to implement”—to return stolen or improperly obtained lands,
especially in a manner that might expand the sovereignty of Indian nations.
Thus, the incontrovertible fact of present-day private ownership and property rights foreclosed all other terms of contestation.
A Genealogy of Possession
In 1823, Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion on Johnson v. M’Intosh established the basis of both federal Indian law and subsequent property law in the United States. In the Court’s ruling, Marshall
provided an extended exegesis on the conquest of the “New World” that
built on and revised past interpretations of European imperial sovereignty
to assert the “doctrine of discovery.” This doctrine minimized potential
interimperial conflict during the early period of exploration and conquest
by guaranteeing title to the first European power to claim and colonize a
territory. Property rights were inaugurated by European discovery because
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of what Marshall described as the colonial-era perception that New World
inhabitants were of a lesser “character and religion” and were “fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly
from the forest.”12 Thus, according to Marshall, “discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or
by conquest.”13 When the United States won independence from England,
it also acquired this exclusive right. Furthermore, by specifying that this
was a right to extinguish Indian title of occupancy and not ownership, Marshall deliberately interceded in the debates of his time to retroactively strip
Indians of their status as owners of the land they occupied.14 Ownership
appeared as an exclusively Euro-American faculty and did not preexist the
right of discovery.
Marshall’s logic of property rights relied on a fiction whose history of
utility can be traced most saliently back to John Locke. Marshall’s assertion that American Indians were principally hunters with no established
attachment to place or agricultural practice was contrary to common
knowledge at the time. Locke, who wrote the Carolina land laws in service
to the Earl of Shaftesbury and pursued his own ill-fated agricultural venture in the same territory before completing his Two Treatises of Government, relied extensively on this trope of American Indians as exemplars of
“natural man.” A fictionalized and generic depiction of indigenous peoples
in America served a double utility for Locke. On the one hand, they were
for him evidence that freedom was the natural condition of humankind
and that—in contrast to Sir Robert Filmer’s divinely ordained patriarchalism—people were not by nature subject to the rule of others. On the other
hand, their purported lack of settled agricultural labor—indeed, their presumed elemental freedom that Locke extolled in his case for natural liberty—served as the basis for his justification of settler colonialism. Indians
were his evidence that there existed no inherent right to property in land
and that only appropriation through labor provided the rights of ownership. Because, according to Locke, Indians neither cultivated nor enclosed
land, the British colonists could reasonably claim property rights by way of
settlement and agricultural labor.15 Government was a corollary of private
property, a mechanism to guarantee individual property rights. Although
Locke’s Two Treatises were formulated in defense of British colonialism,
his theory of innate freedom, naturalization of property, and conception
of the separation of powers in government were foundational for the new
American republic.16
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During the American Revolution and the early national period, tension
between states seeking to expand both their authority and territory and the
federal government’s efforts to secure the confederacy were paramount.
In the years between the creation of the Second Continental Congress and
the end of the war, the issue of western lands loomed large in the postwar plans of the states. A number of states asserted conflicting territorial
boundaries, each justifying their entitlement by colonial charter. The war
ended the negotiated “middle ground” of French and British colonialism, where indigenous peoples had maintained their capacity to partially
shape the colonial encounter, and initiated a new era in the consolidation
of colonial dominance and continental conquest.17 In the years immediately following the Treaty of Paris, relations with American Indian nations
and the delineation of political boundaries were flashpoints in the struggle
between individual states and the federal government over the distribution
of authority and governance in the new republic. The Trade and Intercourse
Acts of 1790 and 1793 required that all land transactions involving Indians
and non-Indians, including state governments, be approved and authorized
by Congress. These acts were intended to minimize potential Indian hostilities provoked by white settlement and trespass. States along the eastern
seaboard, however, generally disregarded the acts and proceeded to negotiate treaties and pursue land acquisition without federal approval or consultation. Later, in 1891, a New York State court decision went so far as to
assert legal principle for this noncompliance with what became known as
the Thirteen Original States Doctrine.18
The legal recourse that did exist for states, if only ambiguously, was the
sale or transfer of preemption rights to would-be settlers and land speculators. These rights did not convey ownership but rather the privilege of being
first in line to purchase the property once the federal government, or—with
federal approval—the state government, acquired the land. Although preemption rights were first introduced with the understanding that Indians
owned the land, at the turn of the nineteenth century the principle that
Indian territory was the property of the state or federal government with
occupancy rights granted to Indians gradually became the conventional
interpretation. Between the 1790s and 1820s, the burgeoning market for
preemption rights encouraged the redefinition of Indians as occupants
rather than owners.19 With the thriving market in speculative investment
came the added incentive for non-Indians to hasten tribal displacement in
order to reap prospective financial rewards. Johnson v. M’Intosh consum-
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mated the necessary legal standing for preemption rights by giving precedent to the “right of occupancy” perspective.
Marshall’s Johnson ruling had substantial effects on federal policy as well.
Beginning in the 1820s, the federal government accelerated its efforts to
eliminate Indian occupancy in the east. By the mid-nineteenth century, virtually all of the remaining eastern tribes had been forced off their ancestral
lands and compelled by land-exchange treaties to move west of the Mississippi River. Pressure from southern states eager to seize lands held by the
Five Civilized Tribes was especially strong. Despite the extensive and brutal westward relocation of Indian nations, the problem of settler encroachment and trespass on the newly allocated territories quickly became volatile. Reservations were created by the 1851 Indian Appropriations Act in
an effort to limit settler incursion. The legislation capitalized on settlerIndian conflicts as an excuse to further erode the tribal land base and, in
many instances, to remove Indians to the least desirable territory. U.S.
reservation policy triggered all-out military conflict, including the bloody
Sioux and Nez Perce Wars. In the aftermath of violent pacification, Indian
assimilation became the goal of U.S. policy. The 1887 General Allotment
Act not only parceled out reservation land to individual Indians and sold
off supposedly “surplus” property to white settlers, but also endeavored to
detribalize Indians and inculcate “modern” values and conduct through the
presumably transformative capacity of private ownership. During the midtwentieth century, U.S. policy embraced the termination of federal recognition of tribes and encouraged the relocation of individual Indians to urban
centers. The Indian Claims Commission (ICC) Act, passed by Congress in
1946, created certain opportunities for legal redress but was remarkably
limited in scope, especially as it coincided with termination policy. The
ICC restricted settlements to the dollar value of the land at the time when
it was taken and categorically prohibited land recovery. Only cases in which
claims were brought against the federal government were permitted, which
excluded the considerable number of suits in which states, counties, or
individual landowners would be defendants. Because states were so often
at the vanguard of dispossession, the ICC’s prohibition against such claims
preempted more legal action than it enabled.
New York State’s unrelenting purge of the Haudenosaunee (Six Nations
of the Iroquois Confederacy)—the Seneca, Cayuga, Oneida, Onondaga,
Mohawk, and Tuscarora—during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is a prime example of state machinations in defiance of federal edicts.
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Between 1784 and 1838, large tracts of the Haudenosaunee territory were
taken by blatant coercion, fraudulent purchase, or illicit state-instigated
treaty, while many Iroquois were forced or otherwise persuaded to move
westward to what is now Oklahoma, Kansas, and Wisconsin or northwest
to Ontario. Real estate speculators such as the Holland Land Company,
Oliver Phelps, and the Ogden Land Company aggressively conspired to
appropriate Indian title. Public and private construction of transportation
infrastructure—first with the sprawling network of canals and, later, the
statewide New York Central Railroad system—fragmented Haudenosaunee
territory. The Iroquois, under a variety of circumstances, also participated
in the loss of tribal land. After 1842, when western Oneida territory was
allotted to individual Indian owners, all parcels were either leased or sold.20
Likewise, leasing reduced Onondaga territory by four-fifths in the brief
period between 1886 and 1888. Further complicating potential redress,
Congress transferred criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian affairs to
New York State in 1948 and 1950. During the 1950s and 1960s, much of
the remaining Haudenosaunee land was seized by the state for large-scale
public works projects, such as dams and hydroelectric facilities.21
It was not until the landmark Supreme Court decisions in favor of the
Oneida in Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida (1974) and County of
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation (1985) that state impropriety was effectively
challenged. The rulings reasserted that the thirteen original states, including New York, were subject to the Trade and Intercourse Acts and, as such,
positioned federal courts as a viable arena for tribal efforts to regain land
in these states. Subsequent eastern Indian land claims sought to build on
the Oneida precedents (including the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot of
Maine, the Mashpee and Wampanoag of Massachusetts, the Narragansett
of Rhode Island, the Schaghticoke, Mohegan, and Mashantucket Pequot of
Connecticut, and the Catawba of South Carolina).22 Despite the significance
of such momentary victories, the tortuous articulation of juridical reason
and multiscalar distribution of political and legal authority reinforce colonial rule even when appearing to challenge it. Competition or antagonism
between U.S. federal, state, and local governments provides some opportunity for Indian tribes to maneuver, but the U.S. legal system—qualified
only by the plenary power of Congress—remains the absolute limit and
defines the only permissible terms of debate for such tactics. As with its
vote against the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the
United States has carefully avoided any possibility that international law
might take precedence in such matters.
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A Measured Distance
The dispersed character and calculated distance of governance in U.S. liberal settler society bears a crucial historical relation to federalism as well
as to the containment of political contestation. During the time of the 1974
Oneida decision, Richard Nixon’s “new federalism” sought to strengthen
the relative autonomy of the states and to direct government efficiency
through a calculated distribution of administrative authority. This was partially in reaction to the multiple insurgencies of the 1960s and the crisis of
the Keynesian welfare state in the context of global economic involution.
Indigenous actions such as the Alcatraz Island occupation in 1969–71, the
Trail of Broken Treaties and Bureau of Indian Affairs building takeover in
1972, and the violent confrontation at Wounded Knee in 1973 marked a
resurgence of Indian activism that prepared the way for the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act of 1975. At the same time,
the assertion of states’ rights and the burgeoning white hostility to both
state and federal authority—manifest in struggles such as those against
taxation and school integration—advanced the devolution and downsizing
of government. Ronald Reagan’s more robust federalism further rationalized the neoliberal assault on regulative government and put reactionary
populism to work in the upward redistribution of wealth. During the 1970s
and 1980s, as “homeowners” groups gained increasing attention and influence for their criticism of what appeared to be government in general, the
already volatile question of Indian jurisdiction over non-Indians within
reservations resonated with this ascendant antistatist rhetoric.
In the wake of the 1974 and 1985 Oneida rulings, a number of other Haudenosaunee nations filed cases against both New York State and private
landowners. Tribes were considerably divided on the decision to pursue
individual non-Indian owners in land claim suits.23 Although the naming
of non-Indian individuals as defendants may have proven to be ill-advised
strategically, this course of action identified a requisite feature of settler
colonialism. Settlement not only occasioned the multiplication of claims
to political and legal authority, it also promoted the proliferation of illegalities—be they trespass and unlawful inhabitance, or outright violence—
and the measured distance of these transgressions from the propriety of
colonial government. Such illegalities range from the deliberate incapacity
of the General Land Office to enforce the regulation of westward settlement during the nineteenth century to the frequent impunity for crimes by
non-Indians against Indians as a result of federal legislation undermining
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tribal law enforcement. Incidents such as the notorious 1974 Farmington
murders just outside the Navajo Nation and the mob violence against the
Ojibwe in Wisconsin during the 1980s are symptomatic of the persistence
of anti-Indian belligerence.24 The extremist actions of settlers, while often
renounced and sometimes punished by imperial power, have always been
essential to colonial occupation and expansion. This history remains foundational for contemporary nonindigenous land ownership.
In 1993, the Seneca filed a class action lawsuit against the state of New
York, Erie County, and all the private landowners in the claim area (roughly
two thousand, including a few businesses, most of whom were concentrated on Grand Island, New York). Comprised of 17,385 acres of land,
Grand Island is home to more than seventeen thousand non-Indians and
includes a regional amusement park, golf courses, beaches, hotels, and
various other tourist amenities, as well as access to two state parks. A state
expressway across the island links the cities of Buffalo and Niagara Falls.
The suit alleged that the U.S. government, as required by the Trade and
Intercourse Act, had never properly ratified the transfer of land to New York
State in 1815 and that therefore the tribe still held title to Grand Island properties. Because this involved the unauthorized acquisition of title by New
York State, the U.S. Department of Justice joined the Seneca as a plaintiff.25
Grand Island homeowner Darren Brown complained that “the U.S. Government turned its back on the innocent property owners of Grand Island
by saying that they were actually going to defend the Indians in this case!”
Brown protested that the case “could very easily set a dangerous precedent for the United States and every State in the Union.”26 Nevertheless,
in 2002, the Seneca lost their case. The trial court ruled that a 1764 treaty
with Britain in the wake of Pontiac’s Rebellion provided evidence that the
tribe had previously ceded the property in question and that the purchase
by New York State was merely intended to avoid conflict with the tribe over
land the state already owned. The decision was upheld in the Second Circuit of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the case in 2006.
The Seneca Grand Island suit was significant because so much of the litigation and attendant outcry concerned the inclusion of private landowners
as defendants. Reflecting on the broader implications of their victory, lawyers for the defense in the Seneca case emphasized that “the landowners
are innocent third parties, and their undisputed innocence makes them
unique among land claim litigants.”27 Indeed, “innocence” and injury have
long been cornerstones of settler ideology.28 The defense lawyers, with
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their indisputably innocent clients victimized by indigenous legal action,
thus labored to deflect the plaintiffs’ grounds for injury, citing the Catawba
Indian Tribe v. South Carolina ruling that “monetary relief representing fair
value is ‘just compensation’ and constitutionally the equivalent of tangible or
real property.”29 This “just compensation” and monetary award of equivalent damages is construed as the only reasonable and possible outcome
for Indian plaintiffs, but unthinkable for “innocent” landowners who were
“hostages to history.” The defense lawyers insisted that there was “no legal
reason . . . for the tribal plaintiffs to continue to press their claims against
the landowners.”30 But the decidedly nonlegal reason for landowners not
to sell their property and transfer title back to the tribe—because landowners had lived on the property for generations and therefore had a deep,
long-standing connection to that particular place, for which there was no
equivalent in monetary compensation—categorically precluded tribal land
reclamation.31 For the Seneca apparently there could be no comparable
attachment to the place of their ancestors who preceded the landowners’
forefathers.
Just before the Supreme Court opted to pass on hearing the Seneca case,
it reached its milestone ruling on City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of
New York (2005). In 1997 and 1998, the Oneida Nation repurchased title to
land on the open market once held by the Oneida and at the time within the
jurisdiction of the city of Sherrill in upstate New York. Sherrill proceeded
to assess property taxes, which the Oneida ignored on the basis that the
properties were now within the Oneida reservation and therefore nontaxable by states or municipalities. The city sent the Oneida Nation notices of
tax delinquency, held a tax sale where it bought the land, and then initiated
eviction proceedings against the Oneida. A U.S. District Court found in
favor of the Oneida, and this decision was upheld by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals.
In its opinion on the 1985 Oneida case, the Supreme Court advised Congress to enact legislation that would prohibit future Indian land claims
based on violations of the Trade and Intercourse Act. Writing on behalf
of the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell commented, “One would have
thought that claims dating back for more than a century and a half would
have been barred long ago.”32 In his dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul
Stevens elaborated on this aside to argue that the Court should have barred
the Oneida’s claims based on the “doctrine of laches.” Essentially a statute
of limitation, laches assert the unreasonable or unexplained lapse of time
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before legal action, an interval that indicates a rightful claim has been abandoned or foregone and that would impair the defendant’s capacity to dispute the claim. Stevens objected, “Given their burden of explaining nearly
two centuries of delay in the prosecution of this claim, and considering
the legitimate reliance interests of the counties and other property owners
whose title is derived from the 1795 conveyance [New York State’s federally
unauthorized treaty with the Oneida], the Oneida have not adequately justified their delay.”33 No substantive rebuttal of Stevens’s argument appeared
in the 1985 majority decision, and it was precisely to the terms of his objection and the doctrine of laches that the Court returned in its ruling twenty
years later.
In March 2005, in an eight-to-one decision, the Supreme Court overturned the two earlier lower court rulings and decreed that the Oneida
Indian Nation could not expand its tax-exempt land holdings. The Court
decision cited the “long-standing, distinctly non-Indian character” of the
region. Like the U.S. objection to the UN declaration, the Court maintained,
“Generations have passed during which non-Indians have owned and developed the area that once composed the tribe’s historic reservations.” The
Court denied the Oneida’s claim, citing the doctrine of laches and “the
impracticability of returning to Indian control land that generations earlier
passed into numerous hands.”34 In other words, the Court acknowledged
that this territory was formerly part of the Oneida Nation but insisted that
the passage of time and its alienation through proprietary exchange disallowed its reinstatement as tribal land. Moreover, the decision allowed
states and municipal governments opposing tribal sovereignty to raise
equitable defense for the first time in recent history.
The Sherrill decision was quickly taken as precedent to undermine Indian
land claims. It has had significant influence, despite the fact that, as legal
scholar Sarah Krakoff points out, “the weight of federal Indian law counsels
against the application of time-bound defenses to Indian tribes for the good
reason that, for long stretches of [U.S. history], federal and state governments actively prevented tribes from attempting to vindicate their rights,
even rights solemnly set out in treaties and statutes.”35 No sooner had the
Supreme Court passed down its Sherrill decision than the Second Circuit
used the ruling to reverse a $248 million damages award to the Cayuga
Indian Nation for what the federal district court had earlier found to be
indisputable violations of the Trade and Intercourse Act. In overturning the
federal district court, the Second Circuit held that the Sherrill decision “dra-
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matically altered the legal landscape against which we consider plaintiffs’
claims.”36 The ruling against the Cayuga, however, was particularly insidious for how the Second Circuit interpreted the Sherrill ruling. The Supreme
Court’s decision on Sherrill applied to the very specific context of sovereign
immunity and its territorial jurisdiction with regard to laches. The Cayuga
Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki (2005) decision considerably expanded
on this precedent by declaring that laches applied to all forms of redress, in
this case specifically money awarded in damages. Thus, where the 1974 and
1985 Oneida rulings upended the Indian Claims Commission’s authorization of monetary claims and exclusion of land reclamation, Sherrill once
again inhibited the restitution of sovereign territory. Cayuga went even further by ruling out monetary settlement.37
Patriotism and Propriety
Writing in 2002 for City Journal, a publication of the neoconservative Manhattan Institute, Walter Olson described land claim conflicts in western
New York from the perspective of those purportedly most victimized by the
legal battles between the state and the Haudenosaunee:
By 1999, [Daniel Gates] had been trying for two years to sell his 800acre farm in order to pay off his debts and retire, but he could find
no buyers, even at a cut price. As real-estate broker Michael Gaiser
explained to a reporter, selling land in the Indian claim area had
become a “nightmare,” because the difficulty and delay in getting
title insurance slow down transactions and spook potential buyers.
Rumors periodically sweep the land-claim area that the state will use
eminent domain to condemn privately held land and bestow it on the
tribes as part of a settlement. “I’ve worked on this land all my life,” says
70-year-old soybean farmer Peter Shuster of Seneca Falls; his family,
like Gates’s, had lived on the land for roughly two centuries. He found
it hard to imagine that “you could lose that way of life after all these
years.” But the threat was real.38
In Olson’s story the dwindling upstate economy and uncertain future of
small-scale agriculture in the United States warrant no mention, but the callous threat of tribal land claims jeopardize the very embodiment of American values. Yeomen farmers such as Gates and Shuster, salt-of-the-earth
personifications of the Jeffersonian ideal, were innocent bystanders in dan-
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ger of being robbed of generations of hard work because state bureaucrats
might acquiesce to Indian demands. For Olson, Iroquois efforts at land reclamation were absurd, but the real villain was the state itself, which quixotically conferred legitimacy to such initiatives. He writes, “Few groups could
claim dispossessed status more plausibly—and more romantically—than
Native Americans.”39 The dispossession of American Indians is, for Olson,
a historical fact, but a fact indisputably in the past tense without reasonable claim on the present. The “romantic” and unreasonable attachments of
“liberal” government are the problem with which Olson is concerned. His
narrative renders Indian land claims as yet another pernicious symptom of
the legacy of 1960s liberalism and the racial state it engendered.
The heroes of Olson’s article are members of Upstate Citizens for
Equality (UCE), a group involved in the Sherrill case, as well as numerous
other Indian land claim cases in New York. Since forming in 1997, the same
year that the Oneida began to repurchase territory, UCE has organized multiple chapters across the state, held large-scale public rallies, and directly
lobbied state legislators to end negotiations with tribal nations. It is one
of numerous local and regional antisovereignty groups across the United
States. At the national level, the antisovereignty agenda is represented by
organizations such as the Citizens Equal Rights Alliance and One Nation
United.40 UCE articulates reactionary populist antistatism and ostensibly
post–civil rights antiracism with antisovereignty discourse. UCE and similar groups take particular issue with the ways in which they believe Indian
sovereignty threatens private property rights and with what they allege are
the moral and legal improprieties of Indian casinos. Groups such as UCE
consider the recognition of Indian nationhood as equivalent to the United
States forfeiting national sovereignty.
Whereas the 1970s taxpayer revolt and successive antiwelfare campaigns
disputed what they characterized as the inordinate tax burden placed on
them by the state, the antisovereignty movement protests the tax-exempt
status of Indian nations. UCE was initially organized by small-business
owners operating gas stations and convenience stores, disgruntled because
comparable Oneida businesses were tax exempt and could therefore offer
lower prices. New York State has tried to impose taxes on reservation retailers since the mid-1950s, and in 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
the state had the right to collect taxes on all sales to non-Indians. But, as
Seneca scholar John Mohawk points out, tensions over taxation and enforcement were just as often between tribal merchants and tribal governments.
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Despite plans in the late 1990s to introduce retail taxes collected by the
tribes (not New York) to provide for tribal services and jobs, indigenous
small-business owners refused to cooperate.41
But UCE objections to the Oneida’s tax-exempt status are not simply calls
for a competitive “level playing field”; they are also symptomatic of an unacknowledged sense of racial entitlement and displaced class resentment.
Since opening in 1993, the Oneida’s Turning Stone Casino has supplied
capital to a stagnating upstate economy and become the third largest source
of jobs for non-Indians in the surrounding three-county area.42 Turning
Stone’s financial success has made possible a populist rhetoric that casts
the Oneida as the wealthy elite against whom ordinary New Yorkers must
unite to protect their economic well-being, despite the fact that from a
purely fiscal standpoint the casino has provided substantial revenue to nonIndians in an otherwise anemic economy. This peculiar displacement of
class resentment is evident throughout UCE discourse and conflates the
economic status of all Haudenosaunee nations with the small faction of
Oneida aligned with casino magnate Ray Halbritter. Speaking at a UCE
rally, Rich Ricci, a member of the Seneca County Board of Supervisors, proclaimed, “They [Cayuga Indians] may out-money us, but they don’t out-gun
us. . . . We’re a bunch of rag-tag soldiers who will fight like hell.”43 Ricci’s
statement speaks not only to an incendiary patriotism but to the affective,
violent attachments of antisovereignty rhetoric.
UCE’s focus on casinos, property rights, and taxation is intended to challenge the legitimacy of tribal sovereignty and is often couched in terms
that either charge the federal government with allocating “special rights”
for Indian peoples or accuse Indian nations of demanding such inequitable rights. The antisovereignty movement shares rhetorical strategies
with campaigns against U.S. welfare programs as overly permissive and
promoting a culture of dependency. The federal government’s paternalism is cast as a root cause of moral decline and economic inequality. For
instance, Walter Olson disparages how federal “Indian law had as a key
premise the idea that tribes were childlike ‘wards’ of Washington, incapable
of looking after their own interests.”44 Ironically, he makes this observation
in the service of his broader diatribe against contemporary Indian claims
for self-determination and restitution. In the now well-worn neoconservative condemnation of Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society, the liberal state
is characterized as having encouraged fraudulent or excessive claims by
people of color and the poor. In this narrative, not only did the state fos-
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ter inequality by undermining the self-initiative of certain populations but
liberal policy makers developed a codependent state that rapidly expanded
through the illegitimate transfer of money from deserving hard-working
citizens to opportunistic, undeserving poor people of color.
But the antisovereignty discourse of groups such as UCE is also distinct
from these campaigns for the ways in which it places patriotism at the center of its rhetoric. UCE casts its platform and members as a more authentic
embodiment of American principles than either New York State or the federal government. UCE’s slogan, “Born in the USA: We Are Native American,” on the one hand, trivializes claims to Indian identity but, on the other,
affirms the inborn patriotic fidelity of UCE members in opposition to the
presumably corrupted machinations of the state. The spokesman of an antigaming organization closely allied with UCE likewise insists, “Our direct
targets have never been the Indian nations themselves. Rather, our quarrel
is with our own governments, at the national, state and local levels, who
have participated or acquiesced in a cynical attempt to use the Indians to
enable them to avoid compliance with [New York State’s] Constitutional ban
on casino gambling.”45 Similarly, UCE members often assert the betrayal of
their private property rights by the federal or state government. According
to Seneca Falls resident Harry Eno, it’s the “same old story. All levels of
government are against the property owners.”46 Whereas right-wing movements such as the taxpayer revolt in the 1970s also focused on the ostensibly illegitimate fiscal incursions of the state, the antisovereignty movement bases its position not on the grounds that the state supports morally
reprehensible redistribution, but rather that government recognition of
Indian sovereignty undermines the fundamental principles of equality and
private property rights and as such threatens the political coherence of the
United States. As one UCE activist puts it, “Like the pledge of allegiance
says: ‘One nation under God indivisible.’”47 Thus, despite all evidence and
precedent that qualifies and complicates U.S. sovereign rule—precisely
the inconsistent and convoluted juridical reason that has both diminished
and affirmed tribal sovereignty—according to antisovereignty activists, in
the final instance pious allegiance compels the absolute singularity of the
U.S. nation. Such an injunction, given the antisovereignty movement’s sustained hostility to federal authority, also reiterates the distinction between
the sanctity of the nation and the culpability of the state.
In terms reminiscent of opponents to affirmative action, antisovereignty
activists vehemently disclaim the possibility that their actions or rhetoric is
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racist. They argue that their platform is merely defensive. It is about equality
under the law and does not single out any specific group of people. In 2000,
Bernie Conklin, then UCE vice president, explained the organization’s position in the following terms: “We’re fighting a land claim here. We are not
fighting a people. We would be fighting this if it was the Italian community,
or German community, or any other group that set themselves up to do
this.”48 Likewise, UCE activist Rodman Lott objected, “If they would live
here like we do, there would be no problem with any Indian, any tribe. . . .
But this thing of a sovereign nation, of a country in a country? As long
as us residents have meetings, we will never, never agree on a sovereign
nation—or anything but one country.”49 Of course, as these statements
make clear, the terms of the “fight” and the demand to “live here like we
do” are intelligible only as opposition to the particular claims of Indian sovereignty. Furthermore, groups such as UCE insist that Indian sovereignty
is itself inherently racist and prejudicial. A. R. Eguiguren’s book Legalized
Racism: Federal Indian Policy and the End of Equal Rights for All Americans,
for instance, is an account of land claims struggles in Minnesota and Wisconsin that develops the charge of Indian racism at length. As is characteristic of the antisovereignty movement, Eguiguren denounces the allegedly
institutionalized racism of the federal government for conferring “special
rights” to tribes, on the one hand, and the supposedly “racial” separatism of
tribal sovereignty, on the other. Eguiguren combines a convoluted denunciation of racism historically with an indictment of tribal nations that conflates sovereignty with claims to superiority: “Racial, ethnic, cultural, and
spiritual superiority is what many European colonists claimed upon first
encountering the indigenous peoples of the Americas. The claim had no
validity then and has no validity now, even when Native sovereignty nationalists use it.”50 Eguiguren argues that the epithet “racist” is used only to
silence antisovereignty activists, but he proceeds to compare Indian sovereignty to white supremacist demands for racial separatism and to suggest
that any federal recognition of tribal sovereignty has been equivalent to
South African apartheid.51 The expansion of tribal sovereignty, warns UCE
newsletter editor Susan Galbraith, would mean the end of rights for nonIndians. Galbraith cautions, “A government of the tribe would exert jurisdiction to some extent over people who cannot participate, who can never
be members no matter how long they reside there unless they are by blood
defined as tribe members.”52 But this jurisdiction is political, not racial
as implied by Galbraith. The colonial regimes of racial classification and
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blood quantum are not inherently tied to tribal self-determination. This
has not prevented some tribal governments, especially in internal conflicts
over resources, from using blood quantum in highly divisive ways, but this
should not obscure the fact that such categories remain colonial constructs.
A number of indigenous scholars—including Audra Simpson, J. Kēhau‑
lani Kauanui, Michael Yellow Bird, and Kim TallBear—have described in
detail the hazards of blood politics and argued for tribal enrollment criteria such as traditional knowledge and forms of kinship not limited to the
biological.53
Nevertheless, antisovereignty activists go so far as to suggest that they
are the true champions of Indian rights. Daniel Warren, chair of the western New York chapter of UCE and director of the Coalition Against Gambling in New York, alleges that tribal governments use their sovereign
status to deprive their members of rights they are guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution. In a remarkable inversion of privilege and oppression, Warren contends, “Racism is the oppression or act of bestowing special rights
and privileges based on one’s race.” According to Warren:
It is Federal Indian Policy which encourages U.S. and New York citizens of Native American descent to live on secluded plots of land called
reservations and be governed by an entity that does not have to give
them the same civil liberties guaranteed by the United States Constitution to other citizens. . . . The Supreme Court in 1954 struck down
the hideous racist concept of “separate but equal,” in all its nefarious
guises—including in my view, Indian reservations, which are outdated
anomalies left over from a sad era of institutionalized racism.54
Since Warren aims to discredit any land claims that the Oneida and other
Haudenosaunee nations in New York have pursued or may pursue, he conflates the historical removal of Indians to reservations with all present-day
Indian territory. By extension, in Warren’s logic, efforts to expand sovereign land claims support the racism of the past and advance racism today.
Similar to Robert Hagen’s UN statement, Warren concludes his editorial,
“One cannot have human rights without equal rights.”55 But of course this
is decidedly untrue: “equal rights” are commonly the purview of particular
nation-states and thus may be precisely the political entitlements against
which, in Arendtian terms, the rights of those without rights—the human
but not the citizen—are asserted.56 In Warren’s formulation, equal rights
must be rights that any and all citizens can claim in law and that support
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the unlikely premise that no right can in any way infringe on another—a
premise that demands the definitive exclusion of those with contested or
collective claims to rights.
At the same time, UCE and other such groups quite explicitly do not aim
to erase the history of continental conquest. Rather, they insist on a facile
and self-serving political realism. The antisovereignty movement advances
a very specific, expediently circumscribed conception of history. In contrast
to neoconservative arguments against affirmative action that dismiss the
historical violence and dispossessions of slavery, apartheid, and racism as
past, the movement collapses present conflicts into one incontrovertible
moment of defeat. One member explains UCE’s position in the following
terms: “History is history, and as I understand it the white man beat the
Indians. There was a war and we won this land.” Another member similarly
affirms, “Look, you have a war and the other guy loses; [they] don’t have
sovereignty, [they]’ve lost it.”57 UCE, like other antisovereignty groups, contends that federal Indian law violates constitutional equality accorded citizens by recognizing American Indian semiautonomy and, if only at times,
the semblance of nation-to-nation relations. In this sense, antisovereignty
activists resemble nativist groups hostile to immigrants and U.S. immigration policy. Speaking of Indian casinos, UCE President Dave Vickers
complains, “The kind of lawlessness that’s taking place [with government
approval] is absurd, and previous generations would not have tolerated their
leadership doing things like this.”58 Therefore, Vickers appears to suggest,
when the state no longer upholds the law and does not protect the rights
of its citizens, the nation of true patriots must intercede on behalf of these
higher principles. Indeed, the nation takes place here in the sense both of
claiming territory and of being constituted in its ostensibly most authentic
form by the actions of vigilante patriots in opposition to the duplicity of the
state.
Colonial Frictions
The U.S. statement against the UN declaration, the Supreme Court’s Sherrill decision, and antisovereignty movement organizations such as UCE
articulate overlapping yet distinct notions of the relationships among
rights, property, and governance in their efforts to refute tribal sovereignty.
In each case, however, there is the simultaneous acknowledgement and
foreclosure of historical violence and dispossession situated in the past.
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From the perspective of legal interpretation, the juridical reliance on precedent requires that the past authorize the present as a norm for the future.59
In his Johnson v. M’Intosh opinion, Marshall distanced himself from the
overt racism of the ruling by contending that its terms were not of his own
device, but rather were the conventions of the historical record with which
the Court was obliged to conform:
However extravagant the pretensions of converting the discovery of an
inhabited country into conquest may appear, if the principle has been
asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country
has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass
of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and
cannot be questioned. . . . However this restriction may be opposed to
natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which the country has been settled, and
be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it may, perhaps,
be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by courts of
justice.60
Marshall’s apparent discomfort with the language of his imperial forefathers has facilitated the still-unchallenged legal standing of the “doctrine
of discovery” and the juridical force of the Johnson ruling.
Jurisprudence is thus propelled forward by precedent substantiated in
Marshall’s calculated narrative of legal history, the full consequence of
which he further enumerated in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) and Worcester v. Georgia (1832). Marshall’s fateful trilogy carefully distinguished the
legal standing of foreign nations, state governments, and tribal nations.61
Indian sovereignty, according to Marshall, was inherently partial and
dependent. Tribes did not have “permanent property in soil, capable of
alienation to private individuals,” and thus could not claim the capacity
for self-government and territorial integrity. As Marshall puts it, “They
remain in a state of nature, and have never been admitted into the general
society of nations.”62 Government was thus a corollary of property. Private
property supplied the material and symbolic support for autonomy as the
affirmation of independence and separateness.63 Since Marshall, the constitutive justification for liberal settler society in the United States has been
that rights are given substance in property, made private in the act of appropriation through (settled, agricultural) labor, and that private property is
requisite for autonomy, which in turn is the basis for self-determination.64
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This legal circularity allows for the assimilationist logic of individual selfproprietorship but disallows collective sovereign claims and the rights
of indigenous peoples. Hagen is exactly right that the logic of “human
rights”—guaranteed as they are in the human as the self-owning private
individual—is antagonistic to the rights of indigenous peoples, but only
because of the way in which colonialism remains constitutive for contemporary proprietary regimes.
The persistence of settler colonialism in the United States as a condition
of possibility and proliferation of political antagonisms nonetheless defies
the historical closure proposed by antisovereignists. Kanienkeha (Mohawk)
scholar Taiaiake Alfred points to the inadequacy of the juridical and political framework of the liberal democratic state for addressing the colonial
present. Alfred argues, “The complex story of what went on in the past and
the tangled complexities of the past’s impact on the present and future of our
relationships are reduced to questions of ‘entitlements,’ ‘rights,’ and ‘good
governance’ within the already established structures of the state.” But the
ongoing colonial dilemma is precisely the impossibility of such a reduction
and resolution in the conventional terms of the state. Alfred contends, “As
majoritarian tyrannies within colonial situations, liberal democratic societies always operate on the assumption that Onkwehonwe [First Peoples
of North America] will succumb and submit to the overwhelming cultural
and numerical force of the Settler society.” In opposition to the supposed
inviolability of past conquest and the colonial present, Alfred proposes an
explicitly anticolonial movement. He argues that “one thing, somewhat
ironically given the long-term objective of restoring Onkwehonwe connections to land, is that the movement will not be tied to territory. . . . Land is
not territory, except in a colonial way of looking at the landscape.”65 One
possibility for confronting the colonial state is a plurinational framework
that goes beyond conventional figurations of sovereignty toward the invigoration of an agonistic pluralism—not liberal ethnic group pluralism or neoliberal multiculturalism, but a reconfiguration of governance shaped by
tribal self-determination and autonomous political authority, as well as recognition of past treaty obligations.66 An anticolonial movement mobilized
around the ethical gap between land and territory might make use of the
historical contingency of sovereignty to breach the occlusions of equality
in law and the fictive integrity of the U.S. colonial present.
Five weeks after the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
was adopted, the declaration had already served as legal precedent. On
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October 18, 2007, the Supreme Court of Belize affirmed the customary
land rights of the indigenous Maya villages of Conejo and Santa Cruz, finding that the government had violated the provisions of the Constitution of
Belize and international law by granting concessions on traditional Maya
land to multinational speculators. Recognition of Maya customary land
rights, while not breaching the liberal framework of rights, nevertheless
troubled colonial proprietary regimes to the degree that previously inadmissible indigenous self-determination successfully resisted the sovereign
authority of Belize. Although considerably different from the U.S. context, here, at least momentarily, the combined political and legal force that
Robert Hagen so decried illuminated the precarious grounds of the colonial
future.67
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1
Abstract for Alyosha Goldstein, “Where the Nation Takes Place: Proprietary Regimes,
Antistatism, and U.S. Settler Colonialism” (SAQ 107:4)

This essay examines the present-day conditions of settler colonialism in the United
States by focusing on the constitutive force of liberal juridical and proprietary regimes
and the historical permutations of federalism. Goldstein argues that white settler
colonialism in the United States is articulated with the present-day constellation of
neoliberal antistatism and post–civil rights “color-blind” discourse. His argument is
developed through an analysis of the U.S. vote against the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, the Supreme Court ruling on City of Sherrill v.
Oneida Indian Nation of New York (2005), and contemporary antisovereignty groups
organizing against American Indian self-determination. Antisovereignty activists
contend that U.S. federal Indian law confers “special rights” based on race to tribes and
that tribal sovereignty not only deprives Indian members of constitutional rights, but
also promotes privileged “racial” separatism fundamentally hostile to the principles of
U.S. democracy. Attending to the problematic formulations of the antisovereignty
movement, Goldstein considers how this rhetoric is both articulated and disarticulated
from the broader structures of governance and juridical authority in the United States.
This essay considers the role of settler land claims historically and in the present, and
studies how contemporary antisovereignty initiatives amplify the history of North
American conquest and genocide in order to argue against the legitimacy of current
tribal claims to land and self-determination.

